CASE DIGEST: Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, G.R. No. 168852

Title: Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, G.R. No. 168852

Subject Matter: Applicability of the doctrine of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code to R.A. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act of 2004)

Facts:

On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari Go-Tan and Steven Tan were married. Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner Go-Tan filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological, and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e) (2) (3) (4), (h) (5) and (i) of Republic Act No. 9262.

Issue:

Whether or not respondents-spouses, Perfecto and Juanita, parents-in-law of Sharica, may be included in the petition for the issuance of a protective order, in accordance with RA 9262.

Held:

Yes, the Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. While the provisions of RA 9262 provides that the offender be ralted or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC. In Section 47 of RA 9262, it has expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as RA 9262 in which the special law is silent on a particular matter. 

CASE DIGEST: People v. Jaime Jose, G.R. No. L-28232

Title: People v. Jaime Jose, G.R. No. L-28232

Subject Matter: Conspiracy

Facts:

On June 26, 1967, four principal-accused Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda Jr., Eduardo Aquino and Rogelio Cañal conspired together, confederated with and mutually helped one another, then and there, to willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design to forcibly abduct Magdalena “Maggie” dela Riva, 25 years old and single, a movie actress by profession at the time of the incident, where the four principal accused, by means of force and intimidation using a deadly weapon, have carnal knowledge of the complainant against her will, and brought her to the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, and hence committed the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape.

Having established the element of conspiracy, the trial court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of forcible abduction with rape and sentences each of them to the death penalty.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court made a proper ruling of the case considering the element of conspiracy.

Held:

No, the trial court’s ruling was not proper. The SC ruled that since the element of conspiracy was present, where the act of one is the act of all, each of the accused is also liable for the crime committed by each of the other persons who conspired to commit the crime. The SC modified the judgment as follows: appellants Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda Jr., and Eduardo Aquino are guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and each and every one of them is likewise convicted of three (3) other crimes of rape. As a consequence thereof, each of them is likewise convicted with four death penalties and to indemnify the victim of the sum of P10,000 in each of the four crimes. The case against Rogelio Cañal was dismissed only in so far as the criminal liability is concerned due to his death in prison prior to promulgation of judgment.

CASE DIGEST: Serrano v. People, GR No. 175023

Title: Serrano v. People, GR No. 175023

Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code; Stages of felonies

Facts:

A brawl involving 15 to 18 members of two rival groups resulted to the stabbing of Anthony Galang, the victim, by the herein petitioner, Giovannie Serrano. During the rumble, the victim was stabbed at the left side of his stomach and was beaten until he fell into a nearby creek. In his fallen position, Galang claimed that when he inspected his stabbed wound, he saw a portion of his intestines showed. The victim received medical attention, stayed in the hospital for one week and thereafter stayed home for one month to recuperate.

The RTC held that the crime committed reached the frustrated stage since the victim was stabbed on the left side of his stomach and that the victim had to be referred from an infirmary to hospital for medical treatment. On the other hand, the CA ruled that the crime committed only reached the attempted stage as there was lack of evidence that the stab wound inflicted was fatal to cause the victim’s death. It was observed that the attending physician did not testify in court and that the Medical Certificate and the Discharge Summary issued by the hospital fell short of “specifying the nature or gravity of the wound”.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of attempted homicide instead of frustrated homicide.

Held:

Yes. The crucial point to consider is the nature of the wound inflicted which must be supported by independent proof showing that the wound inflicted was sufficient to cause the victim’s death without timely medical intervention. When nothing in the evidence shows that the wound would be fatal without medical intervention, the character of the wound enters the realm of doubt; under this situation, the doubt created by the lack of evidence should be resolved in favor of the petitioner. Thus, the crime committed should be attempted, not frustrated homicide.

CASE DIGEST: Valenzuela v. People, GR No. 160188

Title: Valenzuela v. People, GR No. 160188

Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code; Stages of theft

Facts:

While a security guard was manning his post the open parking area of a supermarket, he saw the accused, Aristotel Valenzuela, hauling a push cart loaded with cases of detergent and unloaded them where his co-accused, Jovy Calderon, was waiting. Valenzuela then returned inside the supermarket, and later emerged with more cartons of detergent. Thereafter, Valenzuela hailed a taxi and started loading the boxes of detergent inside. As the taxi was about to leave the security guard asked Valenzuela for the receipt of the merchandise. The accused reacted by fleeing on foot, but were subsequently apprehended at the scene. The trial court convicted both Valenzuela and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. Valenzuela appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since he was not able to freely dispose of the articles stolen. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision, thus the Petition for Review was filed before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner Valenzuela is guilty of frustrated theft.

Held:

No. Article 6 of the RPC provides that a felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present. In the crime of theft, the following elements should be present – (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidating of persons or force upon things. The court held that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property by one with intent to gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose the property stolen since he has already committed all the acts of execution and the deprivation from the owner has already ensued from such acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrated stage, and can only be attempted or consummated.

CASE DIGEST: People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19

Title: People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19

Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:

On June 30, 1920, sixer vintas intercepted two Dutch boats which were on its way in the midst of the islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. The six vintas were manned by 24 armed Moros. The said Dutch boats were carrying men, women and children. At first, the Moros asked for food. But when they got on the Dutch boats, they asked for themselves all the vessel’s cargo, attacked nearly all of the men and brutally violated two of the women by methods too tremendous to be described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, except the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge. The Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro, the two women were able to escape.

Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu. They were arrested there and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy.

Issue:

Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime of piracy alleged in this case.

Held:

Yes, the Philippine courts have jurisdiction on the case. Piracy is a villainy not against any particular state but against all mankind. It should be tried and punished in the sufficient tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy, unlike all other crimes, has no territorial limits.

CASE DIGEST: US v. Fowler, 1 Phil. 614

Title: US v. Fowler, 1 Phil. 614

Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:

In August 12, 1901, the defendants were accused of the theft of 16 champagne bottles worth 20 dollars while on board the vessel, “Lawton”. The counsel for defendants alleged to the Court of First Instance of Manila that they were without jurisdiction over the crime charged. Since it happened in the high seas and not in the city of Manila or in the territory in which the jurisdiction of the court extends, they asked that the case be dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction over the criminal case theft committed on board while navigating on high seas on a vessel not registered in the Philippines.

Held:

No. The Philippine court has jurisdiction over the crime of theft committed on high seas on board a vessel not registered or licensed in the Philippines. The English Rule states that such crimes are triable in our country when crimes are committed on board a foreign vessel sailing from a foreign port and which enters the Philippine waters. In the case at bar, the vessel Lawton was navigating the high seas at the commission of the crime. Given the location of the vessel at the time, such act is not triable within our jurisdiction.

CASE DIGEST: People v. Genosa, GR No. 135981

Title: People v. Genosa, GR No. 135981

Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art. 11(1) and Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:

Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November 15, 1995, attacked and wounded his husband which ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant, she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night and it was her husband who began the provocation. The appellant said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely.

The appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The appellant said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos. The appellant, after being interviewed by specialist, has been shown to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome. The appellant with a plea of self-defense admitted the killing of her husband. She was found guilty of the crime of parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.

Issues:

(1)    Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense.

(2)    Whether or not treachery attended the killing.

Held:

For the first issue, the SC held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense arising from battered woman syndrome, to wit: (a) Each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimated partner; (b) The final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life, and; (c) At the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable – not necessarily immediate and actual – grave harm to the accused based on the history of violence perpetuated by the former against the latter.

For the second issue, the SC ruled out treachery as an aggravating circumstance because the quarrel or argument that preceded the killing must have forewarned the victim of the assailant’s aggression.

Divorce Law

Legalization of Divorce in the Philippines

Every country and nation in the world has divorce laws, except the Vatican City, which is an ecclesiastical sovereign city-state, and the Philippines. While the Philippines has currently what we call a relative divorce, or legal separation, the country does not have the liberal divorce laws that the other countries enjoy.

Many argue that the Philippines does not need a divorce law because the Family Code of the Philippines already provides for the termination of marriages through “annulment”. Moreover, the Family Code also provides for the remedy of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and legal separation. It is my contention that this argument is misleading. In the case of annulment, this remedy is based on specified grounds that occurred at the time of the celebration of the marriage, such as lack of parental consent and vitiated consent (as when a person married another at gunpoint). The remedy of annulment expires, and the defect may actually be cured by ratification through free and voluntary cohabitation. Moreover, when it comes to the degree of legal separation, said decree does not end the marital bond between the spouses and the legally-separated couples are now allowed to remarry.

A divorce law will provide a remedy that the current provisions on the Family Code do not. Divorce does not concern itself with validity or invalidity of a marriage.  It terminates a marriage based on a ground that occurred during the marriage, which makes the marital relationship no longer tenable, regardless of the spouse’s psychological constitution. A divorce law will provide a straightforward remedy to a marital failure. It will benefit Filipinos wherever they are.

Divorce protects and strengthens the family; it is legal, constitutional, and in compliance with the international human rights obligations of the Philippines; it answers the issues on and inadequacies of the existing legal framework on nullity, annulment, and legal separation; it is one of the solutions to decrease, if not end, spousal violence; and its absence is discriminatory on the grounds of social class, religion, and nationality.

Approved Republic Acts (Jan-July 2015)

REPUBLIC ACTS

A Republic Act is a piece of legislation used to create policy in order to carry out the principles of the Constitution. It is crafted and passed by the Congress of the Philippines and approved by the President of Philippines. It can only be repealed by a similar act of Congress.

The following are the newly approved R.A.'s for the year 2015:

Republic Act No. 10653 

Date of Approval: February 12, 2015
Title: An act adjusting the 13th month pay and other benefits ceiling excluded from the computation of gross income for purposes of income taxation, amending for the purpose Section 32(b), Chapter VI of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended

Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10611

Date of Approval: February 20, 2015
Title: Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Food Safety Act of 2013

Republic Act No. 10654

Date lapsed into law without the signature of the President:  February 27, 2015
Description: In accordance with Article VI, Section 27 (1) of the Constitution

Republic Act No. 10655

Date of Approval: March 13, 2015
Title: An Act Repealing the Crime of Premature Marriage under Article 351 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code

Republic Act No. 10656

Date of Approval: March 25, 2015
Title: An Act Postponing the Sangguniang Kabataan Elections to the last Monday of October 2016, amending for the purpose Republic Act No. 9164, as amended, entitled “An Act providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending Republic Act No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the ‘Local Government Code of 1991′ and for other purposes”

Republic Act No. 10657

Date of Approval: March 27, 2015
Title: An Act Regulating and Modernizing the Practice of Chemistry in the Philippines, repealing for the purpose Republic Act numbered seven hundred fifty-four (R. A. No. 754), otherwise known as the Chemistry Law of the Philippines

Republic Act No. 10658

Date of Approval: March 27, 2015
Title: An Act separating the City of Biñan from the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna to constitute the Lone Legislative District of the City of Biñan

Republic Act No. 10659

Date of Approval: March 27, 2015
Title: An Act Promoting and Supporting the Competitiveness of the Sugarcane Industry and for other purposes

Republic Act No. 10660

Date of Approval: April 16, 2015
Title: An Act strengthening further the Functional and Structural Organization of the Sandiganbayan, further amending Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, and appropriating funds therefor

Republic Act No. 10661

Date of Approval: May 29, 2015
Title: An Act declaring November of every year as National Children’s Month

Republic Act No. 10665

Date of Approval: July 9, 2015
Title: An Act Establishing the Open High School System in the Philippines and Appropriating Funds Therefor

Republic Act No. 10667

Date of Approval: July 21, 2015
Title: An act providing for a national competition policy prohibiting anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position and anti-competitive mergers and acquisitions, establishing the Philippine competition commission and appropriating funds therefor

Republic Act No. 10668

Date of Approval:  July 21, 2015
Title: An act allowing foreign vessels to transport and co-load foreign cargoes for domestic transshipment and for other purposes

(Source: Official Gazette, website: www.gov.ph)

The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines

Article 1. National Territory

The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.

Top 10 Law Schools in the Philippines

Top 10 Law Schools in the Philippines

According to the Legal Education Board, the top ten law schools in the Philippines based on the passing rate from 1913 to 2014 included the following:

1. University of the Philippines College of Law (passing rate of 98.90%)
2. Ateneo de Manila University Law School (passing rate of 85.60%)
3. San Beda College of Law (passing rate of 79.90%)
4. University of Santo Tomas Faculty of Civil Law (passing rate of 75.00%)
5. University of San Carlos College of Law (passing rate of 70.00%)
6. Ateneo de Davao University College of Law (passing rate of 65.50%)
7. Arellano University Law Foundation (passing rate of 43.00%)
8. Xavier University - Ateneo de Cagayan College of Law (passing rate of 40.30%)
9. Far Eastern University Institute of Law (passing rate of 36.12%)
10. University of San Agustin Iloilo College of Law (passing rate of 34.23%)

To see the top law schools and universities in the world for 2015, read the following post World's Best Law Schools.

The Regalian Doctrine as embodied in the Philippine Constitution

The Regalian Doctrine and the Philippine Constitution

The Regalian Doctrine is enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution and the country’s earlier Constitutions. In the 1987 Constitution, Section 2 of Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) provides the following:

Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The abovementioned provision provides that except for agricultural lands for public domain which alone may be alienated, forest or timber, and mineral lands, as well as all other natural resources must remain with the State, the exploration, development and utilization of which shall be subject to its full control and supervision albeit allowing it to enter into coproduction, joint venture or production-sharing agreements, or into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization.

The said provision in the 1987 Philippine Constitution had its roots in the 1935 Philippine Constitution. Section 1 of Article XIII (Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources) of the 1935 Philippine Constitution provides the following:

Section 1. All agricultural timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

Then in the 1973 Philippine Constitution, the classifications of land and the Regalian Doctrine are provided under Section 8, Article XIV (The National Economy and The Patrimony of The Nation), which states the following:

Section 8. All lands of public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, or resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twentyfive years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than development of water power, in which cases, beneficial use may by the measure and the limit of the grant.

As shown in the above provisions, the 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber. Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following classifications: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be provided by law, giving the government great leeway for classification. However, the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition—national parks. Of these classifications, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.

To know more about the Regalian Doctrine, read the following article: The Regalian Doctrine.

The Regalian Doctrine

The Regalian Doctrine

The Regalian Doctrine, also known as “jura regalia”, is a fiction of Spanish colonial law that has been said to apply to all Spanish colonial holdings. More specifically, the Regalian Doctrine refers to the feudal principle that private title to land must emanate, directly or indirectly, from the Spanish crown with the latter retaining the underlying title. Lands and resources not granted by the Crown remain part of the public domain over which none but the sovereign holds rights. Generally, under this concept, private title to land must be traced to some grant, express or implied, from the Spanish Crown or its successors, the American Colonial Government, and thereafter, the Philippine Republic. In a broad sense, the term refers to royal rights, or those rights to which the King has by virtue of his prerogatives.

Based on the Laws of the Indies, the capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power of dominium, as cited in the Cruz v. DENR case. This was the foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia. The "Regalian Doctrine" or jura regaliais a Western legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards into the country through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas. The Laws of the Indies, i.e., more specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, set the policy of the Spanish Crown with respect to the Philippine Islands in the following manner: "We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish.”

The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and conquest. Consequently, all lands became the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. The Spanish Government took charge of distributing the lands by issuing royal grants and concessions to Spaniards, both military and civilian. Private land titles could only be acquired from the government either by purchase or by the various modes of land grant from the Crown (Cruz v. DENR).

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain. Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.

For an extended discussion of the Regalian Doctrine, read the article titled The Regalian Doctrine as Embodied in the Philippine Constitution.

Republic Act No. 8371—The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997

R.A. No. 8371—The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997

Republic Act (RA) No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997, has been around for almost fifteen years to recognize and protect the rights of the Indigenous People of the Philippines. More specifically, RA No. 8371 is an act to recognize, protect, and promote the rights of indigenous cultural communities/indigenous people, creating a national commission of indigenous people, establishing implementing mechanisms, appropriating funds therefor, and for other purposes. In simple words, the said Act provides indigenous peoples (IPs) the right to their ancestral domains and lands.

Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the Filipino mainstream. While the mainstream Filipinos are Christians, the indigenous people are the non-Christians. Accordingly, the IPs “live in less accessible, marginal, mostly upland areas. They have a system of self-government not dependent upon the laws of the central administration of the Republic of the Philippines. They follow ways of life and customs that are perceived as different from those of the rest of the population” (Cruz v. DENR).

Ancestral domains, based on the definition provided in RA No. 8371, transcend physical and residential territories to include areas of spiritual, cultural and traditional practices. Ancestral domains, as defined in the IPRA, “refer to all areas generally belonging to [Indigenous Cultural Communities] ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.”

Ancestral lands, which are part of ancestral domains, are defined in RA No. 8371 as lands “occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.”

RA No. 8371 provides IPs’ the rights to ancestral domains, which include the right of ownership, right to develop lands and natural resources, right to stay in the territories, right in case of displacement (temporary or permanent resettlement and right to return), right to regulate entry of migrants, right to safe and clean air and water, right to claim parts of reservations (except those intended for common public welfare and service) and the right to resolve conflict. For ancestral lands, in particular, IPs have the right to transfer land/property rights to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs and the right to redeem the property in case of transfers that raise questions on consent given by IPs and transfers made with unjust considerations and/or prices.

IPs in the Philippines can claim ownership of their ancestral domains in three different ways, which include the following—(1) by virtue of a native title, getting formal recognition of ownership by acquiring a certificate of ancestral domain title (CADT); (2) certificate of ancestral land title (CALT) from the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)-Ancestral Domains Office (ADO); or (3) by securing a certificate of title by virtue of “Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496. A native title, according to RA No. 8371, “refers to pre-conquest rights to land and domains, which, as far back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest.” A CALT or CADT, on the other hand, is granted by the government and is provided for by law to those IPs who wish to obtain these titles. The IPRA, specifically Section 12, also states that IPs have the option to acquire certificates of title under the provisions of the amended Commonwealth Act No. 141. This Act follows the Torrens System of land registration and titles issued under this system are called Torrens titles.

Battered Woman Syndrome

Battered Woman Syndrome

R.A. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act describes Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) as a scientifically defined pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms found in women living in battering relationships as a result of cumulative abuse. This definition is somewhat vague since it is very general in nature, and does not give specific qualifications and conditions in order for a woman to be classified as battered woman. Another definition is based on jurisprudence. In People vs. Marivic Genosa, G.R. No. 135981 January 15, 2004, the Supreme Court defined “battered woman” as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights.” More specifically, the Supreme Court qualifies that the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice in order to be classified as a battered woman. Accordingly, “any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs for a second time, and that said woman remains in the situation, she is classified as a battered woman.” 

The Supreme Court in the People v. Marivic Genosa held that BWS is “characterized by the so-called ‘cycle of violence,’ which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, non-violent) phase.” In the first phase, minor battering occurs which could be verbal or slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior. In the second phase, brutality, destructiveness and, sometimes, death occurs. In the last phase, the couple experience profound relief. In the People v. Torres, 128 Misc2d, 129, 488 NYS2d 358 and McMaugh v. State, 612 A.2d 725 cases which were some of the bases of the People v. Genosa case, “battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional beliefs about the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency to accept responsibility for the batterer’s actions; and false hopes that the relationship will improve.” 

In the People v. Genosa case, the woman was sentenced to imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to 14 years 8 months and 1 day as maximum because [1] the presence of BWS was not proven; and [2] the SC’s decision was limited with the prevailing provisions of the Revised Penal Code which did not consider BWS as a justifying circumstance that would enable Genosa to claim valid self-defense—as the case was decided several months before the passage of R.A. 9262 into law in March 2004.

The VAWC or R.A. No. 9262 is meritorious in introducing the concept of a Battered Woman Syndrome as a defense on the side of the victim-survivor who has intentionally or unintentionally murdered the abuser. It protects the victim-survivor by extinguishing her criminal and civil liability. On Sec. 26 of R.A. 9262, “victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.” Hence, under R.A. 9262, even if the elements of self-defense are not present, a woman suffering from the said syndrome shall not be criminally and civilly liable. BWS becomes a justifying circumstance that can acquit the accused woman. In effect, this gives a very broad protection for the woman suffering from BWS. However, expert psychiatrists/psychologists must attest with proper examination and documentation that the victim is indeed suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome.

The concept of battered woman only applies to wives or women who are in any form of dating or intimate relationship with men. Despite the interesting development of the concept of BWS in Philippine laws, its application to prevailing circumstances has yet to be observed and tested. 

Statutory Construction on Different Statutes

          Statutory Construction on Different Statutes

·      Curative statutes

-         enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements

-         their purpose is to give validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with

-         retroactive

·         Redemption laws

-         Remedial in nature

-         construed liberally to carry out purpose, which is to enable the debtor to have his property applied to pay as many debtor’s liability as possible

·         Statutes providing exemptions from execution

-         Interpreted liberally in order to give effect to their beneficent and humane purpose

-         Construed in favor of the exemption from execution

·         Laws on attachment

-         Liberally construed in order to promote their objects and assist the parties in obtaining speedy justice

·         Warehouse receipt laws

-         Liberally construed in favor of bona fide holders of such receipts

·         Probation laws

-         Liberally construed to achieve objective, to give first-hand offenders a second chance to maintain his place in society through the process of reformation

·         Statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution

-         Liberally construed for the advancement of the purposes and objectives for which it was created

Based on the book, Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo

Statutory Construction on the Rules of Court

             Rules of Court

·         The Rules of Court, being procedural, are to be construed liberally to effectuate purpose—the   proper and just determination of a litigation.

·         Rules of Court should not be interpreted to sacrifice substantial rights at the expense of technicalities

·         Technicalities, when they are not an aid to justice, deserve scant consideration from the courts.

The literal stricture of the rules has been relaxed in favor of liberal construction in the following:

1.      Where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice

2.      Where the interest of substantial justice will be served

3.      Where the resolution of the emotion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court

4.      Where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure

Based on the book, Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo

Statutory Construction of Veteran and Pension Laws

Veteran and pension laws

·         Veteran and pension laws: Liberal construction to effectuate purpose of the law—to compensate a class of men who suffered in the service for the hardships they endured and the dangers they encountered in line of duty.

·         Retirement laws: Liberal construction in favor of the retiree—“to provide for sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood.” (Santiago vs. COA)

Cases:

·         Ortiz vs. Commission on Elections (courtesy resignation)

·         In Re Application for Gratuity Benefits of Associate Justice Efren I. Plana (lack of age requirement for retirement)

·         In re Pineda (requirement in applying the Plana Doctrine)

·         In re Martin (availing of disability retirement benefits)

·         Cena v. Civil Service Commission (reaching the compulsory retirement age but not the service requirement) 

Based on the book, Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo

Statutory Construction of Adoption Statutes

Adoption statutes

·         Liberal construction in favor of the child to be adopted.

·         Reason: adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care, and education for the unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter.

Based on the book, Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo

Statutory Construction on Statutes Prescribing Prescriptions of Crimes

Statutes prescribing prescriptions of crimes

·         Statutes of limitations and law on prescription of crimes are liberally construed in favor of the accused.

·         Reason: the very existence of the statute is a recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs, and innocence, has assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt.

·         Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code – ‘the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents’

Based on the book, Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo

Statutory Construction on Amnesty Proclamations

Statutory Construction on Amnesty Proclamations

Amnesty proclamations

·    Liberal construction to achieve purpose – to encourage the return to the fold of the law of those who have veered from the law.

·    In case of doubt as to whether certain persons come within the amnesty proclamation, the doubt should be resolved in their favor and against the state.

·    Same rule applies to pardon.

Based on the book, Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo

Statutory Construction on Election Laws

Statutory Construction on Election Laws

Election laws

·    Reasonably and liberally construed to achieve their purpose – to effectuate and safeguard the will of the electorate in the choice of their representatives

·    Application involves public interest and imposes upon the courts the imperative duty to ascertain by all means within their command who is the real candidate elected by the people

Three parts of election laws:

1.    The provisions for the conduct of elections which election officials are required to follow

·    Generally, not mandatory but directory merely, and irregularities in conducting an election and counting the votes, not proceeding from any wrongful intent and which deprives no legal voter of his vote will not vitiate an election or justify the rejection of the entire votes of a precinct.

2.    The provisions which candidates for office are required to perform

·    Generally, mandatory. Provisions prescribing the qualifications of candidates, requiring the filing of certificates of candidacy, defining election offenses, and limiting the period within which to file election contests, are mandatory and failure to comply with such provisions are fatal.

3.   The procedural rules which are designed to ascertain, in case of dispute, the actual winner in the elections

·    Given liberal construction. Technicalities should not be sanctioned when it will be an obstacle in the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of public officials.

·    However, where a rigid and strict application and enforcement of provisions of the election law will safeguard popular will and prevent transgression of suffrage and the mandate of the majority, the provisions will be given strict construction.

Based on the book, Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo