CASE DIGEST: Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, G.R. No. 168852

Title: Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, G.R. No. 168852

Subject Matter: Applicability of the doctrine of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code to R.A. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act of 2004)

Facts:

On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari Go-Tan and Steven Tan were married. Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner Go-Tan filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological, and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e) (2) (3) (4), (h) (5) and (i) of Republic Act No. 9262.

Issue:

Whether or not respondents-spouses, Perfecto and Juanita, parents-in-law of Sharica, may be included in the petition for the issuance of a protective order, in accordance with RA 9262.

Held:

Yes, the Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. While the provisions of RA 9262 provides that the offender be ralted or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC. In Section 47 of RA 9262, it has expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as RA 9262 in which the special law is silent on a particular matter. 

CASE DIGEST: Serrano v. People, GR No. 175023

Title: Serrano v. People, GR No. 175023

Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code; Stages of felonies

Facts:

A brawl involving 15 to 18 members of two rival groups resulted to the stabbing of Anthony Galang, the victim, by the herein petitioner, Giovannie Serrano. During the rumble, the victim was stabbed at the left side of his stomach and was beaten until he fell into a nearby creek. In his fallen position, Galang claimed that when he inspected his stabbed wound, he saw a portion of his intestines showed. The victim received medical attention, stayed in the hospital for one week and thereafter stayed home for one month to recuperate.

The RTC held that the crime committed reached the frustrated stage since the victim was stabbed on the left side of his stomach and that the victim had to be referred from an infirmary to hospital for medical treatment. On the other hand, the CA ruled that the crime committed only reached the attempted stage as there was lack of evidence that the stab wound inflicted was fatal to cause the victim’s death. It was observed that the attending physician did not testify in court and that the Medical Certificate and the Discharge Summary issued by the hospital fell short of “specifying the nature or gravity of the wound”.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of attempted homicide instead of frustrated homicide.

Held:

Yes. The crucial point to consider is the nature of the wound inflicted which must be supported by independent proof showing that the wound inflicted was sufficient to cause the victim’s death without timely medical intervention. When nothing in the evidence shows that the wound would be fatal without medical intervention, the character of the wound enters the realm of doubt; under this situation, the doubt created by the lack of evidence should be resolved in favor of the petitioner. Thus, the crime committed should be attempted, not frustrated homicide.

CASE DIGEST: Valenzuela v. People, GR No. 160188

Title: Valenzuela v. People, GR No. 160188

Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code; Stages of theft

Facts:

While a security guard was manning his post the open parking area of a supermarket, he saw the accused, Aristotel Valenzuela, hauling a push cart loaded with cases of detergent and unloaded them where his co-accused, Jovy Calderon, was waiting. Valenzuela then returned inside the supermarket, and later emerged with more cartons of detergent. Thereafter, Valenzuela hailed a taxi and started loading the boxes of detergent inside. As the taxi was about to leave the security guard asked Valenzuela for the receipt of the merchandise. The accused reacted by fleeing on foot, but were subsequently apprehended at the scene. The trial court convicted both Valenzuela and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. Valenzuela appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since he was not able to freely dispose of the articles stolen. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision, thus the Petition for Review was filed before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner Valenzuela is guilty of frustrated theft.

Held:

No. Article 6 of the RPC provides that a felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present. In the crime of theft, the following elements should be present – (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidating of persons or force upon things. The court held that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property by one with intent to gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose the property stolen since he has already committed all the acts of execution and the deprivation from the owner has already ensued from such acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrated stage, and can only be attempted or consummated.

CASE DIGEST: People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19

Title: People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19

Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:

On June 30, 1920, sixer vintas intercepted two Dutch boats which were on its way in the midst of the islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. The six vintas were manned by 24 armed Moros. The said Dutch boats were carrying men, women and children. At first, the Moros asked for food. But when they got on the Dutch boats, they asked for themselves all the vessel’s cargo, attacked nearly all of the men and brutally violated two of the women by methods too tremendous to be described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, except the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge. The Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro, the two women were able to escape.

Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu. They were arrested there and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy.

Issue:

Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime of piracy alleged in this case.

Held:

Yes, the Philippine courts have jurisdiction on the case. Piracy is a villainy not against any particular state but against all mankind. It should be tried and punished in the sufficient tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy, unlike all other crimes, has no territorial limits.

CASE DIGEST: US v. Fowler, 1 Phil. 614

Title: US v. Fowler, 1 Phil. 614

Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:

In August 12, 1901, the defendants were accused of the theft of 16 champagne bottles worth 20 dollars while on board the vessel, “Lawton”. The counsel for defendants alleged to the Court of First Instance of Manila that they were without jurisdiction over the crime charged. Since it happened in the high seas and not in the city of Manila or in the territory in which the jurisdiction of the court extends, they asked that the case be dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction over the criminal case theft committed on board while navigating on high seas on a vessel not registered in the Philippines.

Held:

No. The Philippine court has jurisdiction over the crime of theft committed on high seas on board a vessel not registered or licensed in the Philippines. The English Rule states that such crimes are triable in our country when crimes are committed on board a foreign vessel sailing from a foreign port and which enters the Philippine waters. In the case at bar, the vessel Lawton was navigating the high seas at the commission of the crime. Given the location of the vessel at the time, such act is not triable within our jurisdiction.

CASE DIGEST: People v. Genosa, GR No. 135981

Title: People v. Genosa, GR No. 135981

Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art. 11(1) and Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:

Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November 15, 1995, attacked and wounded his husband which ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant, she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night and it was her husband who began the provocation. The appellant said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely.

The appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The appellant said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos. The appellant, after being interviewed by specialist, has been shown to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome. The appellant with a plea of self-defense admitted the killing of her husband. She was found guilty of the crime of parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.

Issues:

(1)    Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense.

(2)    Whether or not treachery attended the killing.

Held:

For the first issue, the SC held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense arising from battered woman syndrome, to wit: (a) Each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimated partner; (b) The final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life, and; (c) At the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable – not necessarily immediate and actual – grave harm to the accused based on the history of violence perpetuated by the former against the latter.

For the second issue, the SC ruled out treachery as an aggravating circumstance because the quarrel or argument that preceded the killing must have forewarned the victim of the assailant’s aggression.

CASE DIGEST: US vs Ah Sing, 36 Phil 978

Case Title: US vs Ah Sing, 36 Phil 978

Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:

Ah Sing is a fireman at the steamship Shun Chang, a foreign vessel which arrived in the port of Cebu from Saigon. He bought 8 cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board and had them in his possession during the said trip. The 8 cans of opium were found in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine by authorities who made a search upon anchoring on the port of Cebu. The defendant confessed that he was the owner of the opium and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He dis not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited drug.

Issue:

Whether or not the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands is criminally liable in the Philippines.

Held:

Yes. As stated in the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any person who unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is found under this person's control on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign country and is within the jurisdiction limits of the Philippines, is guilty of the crime of illegal importation of opium, unless contrary circumstances exist or the defense proves otherwise.

CASE DIGEST: US vs Bull, 15 Phil 7

Case Title: US vs Bull, 15 Phil 7

Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:

On December 2, 1908, a steamship vessel engaged in the transport of animals named Stanford commanded by H.N. Bull docked in the port of Manila, Philippines. It was found that said vessel from Ampieng, Formosa carried 674 heads of cattle without providing appropriate shelter and proper suitable means for securing the animals which resulted for most of the animals to get hurt and others to have died while in transit.

This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Constitution. It is however contended that cases cannot be filed because neither was it said that the court sitting where the animals were disembarked would take jurisdiction, nor did it say about ships not licensed under Philippine laws, like the ships involved.

Issue:

Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense committed on board a foreign ship while inside the territorial waters of the Philippines.

Held:

Yes. When the vessel comes within 3 miles from the headlines which embrace the entrance of Manila Bay, the vessel is within territorial waters and thus, the laws of the Philippines shall apply. A crime committed on board a Norwegian merchant vessel sailing to the Philippines is within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Philippines if the illegal conditions existed during the time the ship was within the territorial waters - regardless of the fact that the same conditions existed when the ship settled from the foreign port and while it was on the high seas,

In light of the above restriction, the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.